Abstract
Introduction
The main issues in access control of shared computing resources are authentication, authorization and enforcement. Identification of principals is handled by authentication. Authorization addresses the following question: should a request r by a specific principal K be allowed? Enforcement addresses the problem of implementing the authorization during an execution. In a centralized system, authorization is based on the closed-world assumption, i.e., all authorized parties are known and trusted. In a distributed system where all the parties are not known a priori, the closed-world assumption is not applicable. Trust management systems [9] address the authorization problem in the context of distributed systems by requiring that authorization and access-control policies be defined explic-itly, using an appropriate specification language, and relying on an algorithm to determine when a specific request is allowable. A survey of trust management systems, along with a formal framework for understanding them, is presented in [49] . Several trust management systems, such as Binder [18] , Keynote [8] , Referee [15] , and SPKI/SDSI [19] , have been proposed. Our work is presented in the context of SPKI/SDSI, but several aspects of the approach should carry over to other trust management systems and authorization frameworks.
In SPKI/SDSI, principals are the public keys, i.e., the identity of a principal is established by checking the validity of the corresponding public key. In SPKI/SDSI, name certificates define the names available in an issuer's local name space; authorization certificates grant authorizations, or delegate the ability to grant authorizations. The fundamental problem in SPKI/SDSI (or any other trust management system) is the authorization problem (AP), which is defined as follows: given a security policy-which in SPKI/SDSI is represented by a set of name and authorization certificates-can a principal K access resource R?
Certificate-chain discovery refers to the problem of finding a "proof" that K can access resource R. (In the case of SPKI/SDSI, a proof is a chain of certificates.) If found, the proof can be presented by K to R. R checks the validity of the proof, and if the proof is valid, K is allowed access to R. Therefore, algorithms for certificate-chain discovery can also be used in frameworks such as proof-carrying authorization [3] . An efficient certificate-chain-discovery algorithm for SPKI/SDSI was presented by Clarke et al. [16] . An improved algorithm was presented by Jha and Reps [24] . The latter algorithm is based on translating SPKI/SDSI certificates to rules in a pushdown system. In [24] it was also demonstrated how this translation enables many other questions to be answered about a security policy expressed as a set of certificates.
In this paper, we generalize the pushdown-systems approach to enable it to address important security-policy issues such as privacy, recency, validity, and trust. For instance, consider the following authorization example: suppose that company X provides additional insurance to cover prescription-drug expenses that are not covered by a patient's health-maintenance organization (HMO). For exam-ple, the HMO might have a very high deductible for drugs, which will be covered by the additional insurance. However, company X only wants to provide this service to patients of a certain hospital H. For Alice to be able to buy insurance, she needs to prove to X that she is a patient of H. Suppose that there are two certificate chains that prove that Alice is a patient of H, where one reveals that Alice is a patient in the internal-medicine clinic and the other reveals that Alice is a patient in the AIDS clinic. For obvious reasons Alice will prefer to use the former chain. In other words, Alice prefers a certificate chain that reveals the least amount of information about her. Such privacy-related issues can be addressed in our generalized framework.
In the context of SPKI/SDSI, assume that we are given a metric µ on certificate chains, and hence on proofs of authorization. The details of the metric depend on the specific issue being addressed. In the generalized authorization problem (GAP) we are given a principal K, a set of name and authorization certificates C, a resource R, and a metric µ on certificate chains. The question that GAP addresses is the same as AP-i.e., given C, is K authorized to access resource R?-however, an authorization proof that solves a GAP minimizes or maximizes the given metric (depending on the application). We demonstrate that several security-policy issues in trust management systems can be cast as GAPs with appropriate metrics. In particular, we demonstrate how an extension of pushdown systems, called weighted pushdown systems, can be used to solve such generalized authorization problems.
The algorithm for solving GAPs can be thought of as a generalization of the certificate-chain-discovery algorithm. The general strategy is as follows: the set of labeled SPKI/SDSI certificates is first translated to a weighted pushdown system. 1 After the translation, the answer is obtained by solving a generalized shortest-path problem [27, 46, 34] .
The main contributions of the work reported in the paper are as follows:
• The GAP framework. We define the generalized authorization problem and show how versions of several types of security issues related to authorization can be handled in the GAP framework.
• An efficient algorithm for solving GAPs. We present an efficient algorithm for solving GAPs. This yields several new algorithms for a number of specific authorization problems.
• A prototype implementation. The algorithms described in the paper have been implemented in a library that provides functionality for solving GAPs. The library has been made available on the Internet [42] and may also be used by third parties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on SPKI/SDSI. Section 3 defines the GAP framework and discusses several possible applications of it. Section 4 provides background on pushdown systems (PDSs). Section 5 reviews the connection between SPKI/SDSI and PDSs. Section 6 defines weighted PDSs, and shows how an analysis of the transition system defined by a weighted PDS can be used to solve GAPs. Section 7 returns to the discussion of applications of the GAP framework. Section 8 discusses related work. Appendix A describes an enhancement to the algorithm described in Section 6 to generate witnesses or proofs of authorization.
Background on SPKI/SDSI

Principals and Names
In SPKI/SDSI, all principals are represented by their public keys, i.e., the principal is its public key. A principal can be an individual, process, host, or any other active entity. K denotes the set of public keys. Specific keys are denoted by K, K A , K B , K , etc. An identifier is a word over some alphabet Σ. The set of identifiers is denoted by A. Identifiers will be written in typewriter font, e.g., A and Bob.
A term is a key followed by zero or more identifiers. Terms are either keys, local names, or extended names. A local name is of the form K A, where K ∈ K and A ∈ A. For example, K Bob is a local name. Local names are important in SPKI/SDSI because they create a decentralized name space. The local name space of K is the set of local names of the form K A. An extended name is of the form K σ, where K ∈ K and σ is a sequence of identifiers of length greater than one. For example, K UW CS faculty is an extended name.
Certificates
SPKI/SDSI has two types of certificates, or "certs": Name Certificates (or name certs): A name cert provides a definition of a local name in the issuer's local name space. Only key K may issue or sign a cert that defines a name in its local name space. A name cert C is a signed fourtuple (K, A, S, V ). The issuer K is a public key and the certificate is signed by K. A is an identifier. The subject S is a term. Intuitively, S gives additional meaning for the local name K A. V is the validity specification of the certificate. Usually, V takes the form of an interval [t 1 , t 2 ], i.e., the cert is valid from time t 1 to t 2 inclusive. A validity specification can also take the form of an on-line check to be performed. Authorization Certificates (or auth certs): An auth cert grants or delegates a specific authorization from an issuer to a subject. Specifically, an auth cert C is a five-tuple (K, S, D, T, V ). The issuer K is a public key, which is also used to sign the cert. The subject S is a term. If the delegation bit D is turned on, then a subject receiving this authorization can delegate this authorization to other principals. The authorization specification T specifies the permission being granted; for example, it may specify a permission to read a specific file, or a permission to login to a particular host. The validity specification V for an auth cert is the same as in the case of a name cert.
A request r is a triple (K , R, T ) consisting of principals K and R, where R is a resource that K is trying to access, and an authorization specification T that K is trying to exercise on R. The goal of certificate-chain discovery is to prove whether the request is valid. As described in Clarke et al. [16] , we remove all "useless" certificates as follows:
• Remove every name and auth cert that has an invalid validity specification (e.g., an expired validity specification).
• Remove every auth cert C = (K, S, D, T, V ) for which T does not imply the authorization specification T of the request.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that a request r = (K , R, T ) is given and the set of certificates does not contain useless certificates. We will treat certs as rewrite rules:
• A name cert (K, A, S, V ) will be written as K A −→ S.
• An auth cert (K, S, D, T, V ) will be written as
otherwise, it will be written as K £ −→ S ¤.
In authorization problems, we only consider valid certificates, so the validity specification V for a certificate does not appear as part of its rewrite rule. However, for certain generalized authorization problems V is used to derive weights for rules.
The Authorization Problem in SPKI/SDSI
In traditional discretionary access control, each protected resource has an associated access-control list, or ACL, describing which principals have various permissions to access the resource. An auth cert (K, S, D, T, V ) can be viewed as an ACL entry, where keys or principals represented by the subject S are given permission to access resource K.
A term S appearing in the rules can be viewed as a string over the alphabet K∪A, in which elements of K appear only in the beginning. For uniformity, we also refer to strings of the form S £ and S ¤ as terms. Assume that we are given a rewrite rule L −→ R corresponding to a cert. Consider a term S = LX. In this case, the rewrite rule L −→ R applied to the term S (denoted by (L −→ R)(S)) yields the term RX. Therefore, a rule can be viewed as a function from terms to terms, for example,
, and, in addition, assume that L 2 is a prefix of R 1 , i.e., there exists an
For example, consider the two rules: A problem that often needs to be solved is the authorization question: "Given a set of certs C and a request r = (K , R, T ), is K allowed to exercise authorization T on R?" A certificate-chain-discovery algorithm provides more than just a simple yes/no answer to the authorization question; in the case of a yes answer, it identifies a chain of certificates to prove the result. Formally, certificate-chain discovery attempts to find, after removing useless certificates, a certificate chain
Intuitively, (c k • · · · c 1 ) represents a path from R, the resource, to either K £ or K ¤, representing "permission for K to access" with and without delegation, respectively; the elimination of useless certs ensures that the chain represents the authorization specification T .
Clarke et al. [16] presented an algorithm for certificatechain discovery in SPKI/SDSI with O(n 2 K |C|) time complexity, where n K is the number of keys and |C| is the sum of the lengths of the right-hand sides of all rules in C. Jha and Reps [24] presented a different algorithm, based on the theory of pushdown systems.
The Generalized Authorization Problem
In this section, we formally define the generalized authorization problem, or GAP. Later in the section, we show that several issues, such as privacy, validity, recency, and trust, can be formulated in the GAP framework. In this framework, certificates are labeled with weights that are drawn from a bounded idempotent semiring. 
(D, ⊗)
is a monoid with the neutral element 1.
⊗ distributes over ⊕, i.e. for all a, b, c ∈ D we have
a ⊗ (b ⊕ c) = (a ⊗ b) ⊕ (a ⊗ c) and (a ⊕ b) ⊗ c = (a ⊗ c) ⊕ (b ⊗ c) .
0 is an annihilator with respect to ⊗, i.e., for all a ∈ D,
a ⊗ 0 = 0 = 0 ⊗ a.
In the partial order defined by: ∀a, b ∈ D, a b iff a ⊕ b = a, there are no infinite descending chains.
A weighted SPKI/SDSI system WSS is a 3-tuple (C, S, f), where C is a set of certs, S = (D, ⊕, ⊗, 0, 1) is a bounded idempotent semiring, and f : C → D assigns weights to the certs in C. We extend the function f to certificate chains in a natural way, i.e., given a certificate chain
Definition 3.2 Given a weighted SPKI/SDSI system WSS = (C, S, f) and a request r = (K , R, T ), proof (C, r) denotes the set of certificate chains that prove that request r can be fulfilled. Formally, proof (C, r) is the set of certificate chains c k • · · · • c 1 not containing any useless certificates such that:
The generalized authorization problem (GAP) asks the following two questions: (1) Is proof (C, r) non-empty? (2) If proof (C, r) is non-empty, then find the following two quantities:
Certificates weights Figure 1 . A set of weighted certificates.
Notice that the extender operation ⊗ is used to calculate the value of a certificate chain. The value of a set of certificate chains is computed using the combiner operation ⊕. In general, it is enough for ω to contain only a finite set of minimal elements (i.e., minimal with respect to the partial order ). Intuitively, GAP attempts to find a set of certificate chains proving that K can access resource R such that the combination (using the operator ) of their weights is minimal.
(Definition 3.2 actually defines a more general machinery than required for the SPKI/SDSI certificate-chain-discovery problem discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3; the problem defined here allows a witness set of certificate chains to be identified.)
We now demonstrate that several authorization-related problems can be cast in this framework.
Privacy-preserving certificate chains
We return to the example described in the Introduction, in which company X offers additional insurance to patients of a certain hospital H. The certificates relevant to the problem are shown in Figure 1 . K X £ represents the service offered, i.e., the additional insurance offered by company X. The filled square represents the fact that this authorization cannot be delegated, e.g., an eligible patient cannot delegate the permission to buy insurance to one of their friends. The principals corresponding to the AIDS and internalmedicine clinics in hospital H are denoted by K H−AIDS and K H−IM . Alice is a patient in both clinics.
Suppose that Alice wants to buy the insurance. In this case, both (4)
• (1) reveals that Alice probably has AIDS, which is information that Alice may not wish to reveal to company X. Therefore, Alice would prefer to offer the certificate chain (5) • (3) • (1) to company X; it proves that she is authorized to buy additional insurance, but reveals the least amount of information about her.
Privacy can be modeled in the GAP framework using the semiring (D, ⊕, ⊗, 0, 1), defined as follows: D = {I, S}, where I and S stand for "insensitive" and "sensitive", respectively. The 0 and 1 elements are S and I, respectively. The ⊕ and ⊗ operators are defined as follows (where x de-notes either S or I):
It is easy to check that conditions 
Suppose that Alice wants to login to host H. If Alice provides a certificate chain that is only valid for two minutes, then she will be logged off by the host after two minutes. Thus, Alice wants to find a certificate chain that authorizes her to login to H, but has the maximum expiration value among all such certificate chains.
Most-recent certificate chain. Let R(c) be the time (relative to the current time) when the cert c was issued or an on-line check was performed on cert c, i.e., T current − R(c) is the actual time of issue or the last on-line check. We call R(c) the recency associated with cert c. The recency of a certificate chain
Suppose that Alice wants to login to host H. For riskreduction purposes, host H might mandate the use of a certificate chain whose recency is no more than ten minutes. In this case, Alice wishes to find a certificate chain that authorizes her to login to H and has the minimum recency among all such chains. Let 
, where is defined in Table 1 . Suppose that Alice wants to use server S, but S requires a certificate chain that has a trust level above a certain value v. In this case, Alice wants to find a certificate chain that authorizes her to use S, but has the maximal trust level among all such chains. If such a certificate chain has a trust level above v, Alice can use S. Table 1 . Semirings for validity, recency, and trust.
Formalization using semirings. The semirings for the three cases discussed above are shown in Table 1 . In the case of the maximal-trust example, the trust levels are drawn from a totally ordered set with four elements
, and H denote low, medium, and high levels of trust, respectively. The element N stands for "no link". 3 The join and the meet operator on this totally ordered set are defined as follows (where x and y are arbitrary elements of {N, L, M, H}):
Pushdown Systems
A pushdown system is a transition system whose states involve a stack of unbounded length. Definition 4.1 A pushdown system is a triple P = (P, Γ, ∆), where P and Γ are finite sets called the control locations and the stack alphabet, respectively. A configuration of P is a pair p, w , where p ∈ P and w ∈ Γ * . ∆ contains a finite number of rules of the form p, γ → P p , w , where p, p ∈ P , γ ∈ Γ, and w ∈ Γ * , which define a transition relation between configurations of P as follows:
We also write c ⇒ P c to express that there is some rule r such that c Without loss of generality, we assume henceforth that for every p, γ → p , w we have |w| ≤ 2; this is not restrictive because every pushdown system can be simulated by another one that obeys this restriction and is larger by only a constant factor; e.g., see [24] .
Because pushdown systems have infinitely many configurations, we need some symbolic means to represent sets of configurations. We will use finite automata for this purpose. A convenient property of regular sets of configurations is that they are closed under forward and backward reachability. In other words, given an automaton A that accepts the set C, one can construct automata A pre * and A post * that accept pre * (C) and post * (C), respectively. The general idea behind the algorithm for pre * [11, 20] is as follows: Let P = (P, Γ, ∆) be a pushdown system and A = (Q, Γ, → 0 , P, F ) be a P-automaton accepting a set of configurations C. Without loss of generality we assume that A has no transition leading to an initial state. pre * (C) is obtained as the language of an automaton A pre * = (Q, Γ, →, P, F ) derived from A by a saturation procedure. In [20] an efficient implementation of this procedure is given, which requires O(|Q| 2 |∆|) time and O(|Q| |∆| + |→ 0 |) space. Moreover, another procedure (and implementation) are presented for constructing a P-automaton that accepts post * (C). In the following, we show that extensions of these procedures provide efficient algorithms for discovering the certificate chains needed in generalized authorization problems, such as those discussed in Section 3. We will present these extensions for pre * ; the same basic ideas apply to post * , but this is omitted for lack of space.
The Connection Between SPKI/SDSI and Pushdown Systems
The following correspondence between SPKI/SDSI and pushdown systems was presented in [24] : let C be a (finite) set of certificates such that K C and I C are the keys and identifiers that appear in C, respectively; with C we associate the pushdown system P C = (K C , I C ∪ {£, ¤}, ∆ C ), i.e., the keys of C are the control locations and the identifiers form the stack alphabet; the rule set ∆ C is defined as follows: • if C contains a name cert K A −→ K σ (where σ is a sequence of identifiers), then ∆ C contains a rule
For instance, consider the set of certificates C from Figure 1. The corresponding pushdown system P C has the control locations
stack alphabet {patient, £, ¤}, and the set of rules listed in Figure 2 .
The usefulness of this correspondence stems from the following simple observation: A configuration K, σ of P C can reach another configuration K , σ if and only if C contains a chain of certificates that, when applied to K σ, yield K σ . For instance, in the example above Alice can prove that she has the right to buy additional insurance be-
In the authorization problem, we are given a set of certs C and a request (K , R, T ).
In terms of the PDS P C corresponding to certificate set C, the authorization problem can be stated as follows: K should be granted access to R iff the condition R, £ ∈ pre * ({ K , £ , K , ¤ }) holds. Thus, in the medical example, we wish to determine whether K X , £ ∈ pre * (S),
shown in Figure 3 (a) accepts the set S. The set pre * (S) is shown in Figure 3(b) . Because there is a transition on the symbol £ from state K X to the accepting state s, K X , £ ∈ pre * (S). In other words, Alice is authorized to buy additional insurance. (The extra annotations I (insensitive) and S (sensitive) on the transitions indicate whether the transitions involve sensitive information. The algorithm for deriving these labels is presented in Section 6.)
Solving the Generalized Authorization Problem
The types of problems treated in [24] could be characterized as having a qualitative nature; they answer questions such as "Is a given principal allowed to access a given resource?" In this section, we show how to answer questions that have an additional quantitative component, e.g. "How long is a given principal allowed to access a given resource?" To do so, we consider pushdown systems whose rules carry weights.
Weighted Pushdown Systems
We consider pushdown system whose rules are given values from some domain of weights. The weight domains of interest are the bounded idempotent semirings from Definition 3.1.
Definition 6.1 A weighted pushdown system is a triple W = (P, S, f) such that P = (P, Γ, ∆) is a pushdown system, S = (D, ⊕, ⊗, 0, 1) is a bounded idempotent semiring, and f : ∆ → D is a function that assigns a value from D to each rule of P.
Let σ ∈ ∆ * be a sequence of rules. Using f , we can associate a value to σ, i. 
Definition 6.2 Given a weighted pushdown system W = (P, S, f), where P = (P, Γ, ∆), and a regular set of configurations C ⊆ P × Γ
* , the generalized pushdown reachability (GPR) problem is to find for each c ∈ P × Γ * :
• a witness set of paths ω(c) ⊆ 
v(σ) = δ(c).
In general, it is enough for ω(c) to contain only a finite set of paths whose values are minimal elements of { v(σ) | σ ∈ path(c, c ), c ∈ C }, i.e., minimal with respect to the partial order defined in Definition 3.1 (5) .
For the remainder of this section, let W denote a fixed weighted pushdown system: W = (P, S, f), where P = (P, Γ, ∆) and S = (D, ⊕, ⊗, 0, 1); let C denote a fixed regular set of configurations, represented by a P-automaton A = (Q, Γ, → 0 , P, F ) such that A has no transition leading to an initial state.
The GPR problem is a multi-target meet-over-all-paths problem on a graph. The vertices of the graph are the configurations of P, and the edges are defined by P's transition relation. The target vertices are the vertices in C. Both the graph and the set of target vertices can be infinite, but have some built-in structure to them; in particular, C is a regular set.
Because the GPR problem concerns infinite graphs, and not just an infinite set of paths, it differs from other work on meet-over-all-paths problems. As in the (ordinary) pushdown-reachability problem [11, 20] , the infinite nature of the problem is addressed by reporting the answer in an indirect fashion, namely, in the form of an annotated automaton. An answer automaton without its annotations will be identical to an A pre * automaton created by the algorithm of [20] . For each c ∈ pre * (C), the values of δ(c) and ω(c) can be read off from the annotations by following all accepting paths for c in the automaton; for c ∈ pre * (C), the values of δ(c) and ω(c) are 0 and ∅, respectively.
The solution to the GPR problem is presented in several stages:
• We first define a language that characterizes the sequences of transitions that can be made by a pushdown system P and automaton A for C.
• We then turn to weighted pushdown systems and the GPR problem. We use the language characterizations of transition sequences, together with previously known results on a certain kind of grammar problem [46, 34] to obtain a solution to the GPR problem.
• However, the solution based on grammars is somewhat inefficient; to improve the performance, we specialize the computation to our case, ending up with an algorithm for creating an annotated automaton that is quite similar to the pre * algorithm from [20] .
Languages that Characterize Transition Sequences
In this section, we make some definitions that will aid in reasoning about the set of paths that lead from a configuration c to configurations in a regular set C. We call this set the reachability witnesses for c ∈ P × Γ * with respect to C:
It is convenient to think of PDS P and automaton A (for C) as being combined in sequence, to create a combined PDS, which we will call PA. PA's states are P ∪ Q = Q, and its rules are those of P, augmented with a rule q, γ → q , for each transition q
We say that a configuration c = p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n is accepted by PA if there is a path to a configuration q f , such that q f ∈ F . Note that because A has no transitions leading to initial states, PA's behavior during an accepting run can be divided into two phases-transitions during which PA mimics P, followed by transitions during which PA mimics A: once PA reaches a state in (Q − P ), it can only perform a sequence of pops, possibly reaching a state in F . If the run of PA does reach a state in F , in terms of the features of the original P and A, the second phase corresponds to automaton A accepting some configuration c that has been reached by P, starting in configuration c. In other words, PA accepts a configuration c iff c ∈ pre * (C). The first language that we define characterizes the pop sequences of PA. A pop sequence for q ∈ Q, γ ∈ Γ, and q ∈ Q is a sequence of PA's transitions that, and (i) starts in a configuration q, γ , and (ii) ends in a configuration q , ε . The family of pop sequences for a given q, γ, and q can be characterized by the complete derivation trees 4 derived from nonterminal PS (q,γ,q ) , using the grammar shown in Figure 4 . Proof: [Sketch] To shrink the stack by removing the stack symbol on the left-hand side of each rule of PA, there must be a transition sequence that removes each of the symbols that appear in the stack component of the rule's right-hand side. In other words, a pop sequence for the left-hand-side stack symbol must involve a pop sequence for each righthand-side stack symbol.
The left-hand and right-hand sides of the productions in Figure 4 reflect the pop-sequence obligations incurred by the corresponding rule of PA.
2
To capture the set ReachabilityWitnesses( p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n , C), where C is recognized by automaton A, we define a context-free language given by the set of productions shown in Figure 5 .
This language captures all ways in which PDS PA can accept p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n : the set of reachability witnesses for p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n corresponds to the complete derivation trees derivable from nontermi-
The subtree rooted at 
Weighted PDSs and Abstract Grammar Problems
Turning now to weighted PDSs, we will consider the weighted version of PA, denoted by WA, in which weighted PDS W is combined with A, and each rule q, γ → q , that was added due to transition q γ − → q in A's transition set → 0 is assigned the weight 1.
We are able to reason about semiring sums (⊕) of weights on the paths that are characterized by the contextfree grammars defined above using the following concept: Definition 6.3 [34] Let (S, ) be a semilattice. An abstract grammar over (S, ) is a collection of context-free grammar productions, where each production θ has the form
Parentheses, commas, and g θ (where θ is a production) are terminal symbols. Every production θ is associated with a function g θ : S k → S. Thus, every string α of terminal symbols derived in this grammar (i.e., the yield of a complete derivation tree) denotes a composition of functions, and corresponds to a unique value in S, which we call val G (α) (or simply val (α) when G is understood) . Let L G (X) denote the strings of terminals derivable from a nonterminal X. The abstract grammar problem is to compute, for each nonterminal X, the value Figure 4 . A context-free language for the pop sequences of PA, and the PA rules that correspond to each production. Figure 5 . Set of productions.
Because the complete derivation trees with root Accepted[γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n ] (p) encode the transition sequences by which WA accepts p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n , to cast the GPR as a grammar problem, we merely have to attach appropriate production functions to the productions so that for each rule sequence σ, and corresponding derivation tree (with yield) α, we have v(σ) = val G (α). This is done in Figure 6 : note how functions g 2 , g 3 , and g 4 place f (r) at the beginning of the semiring-product expression; this corresponds to a preorder listing of a derivation tree's production instances (cf. Theorem 6.1).
To solve the GPR problem, we appeal to the following theorem: Theorem 6.2 [46, 34] The abstract grammar problem for G and (S, ) can be solved by an iterative computation that finds the maximum fixed point, when the following conditions hold:
1. The semilattice (S, ) has no infinite descending chains.
Every production function
for arbitrary, non-empty, finite index sets I 1 , . . . , I k .
The abstract grammar problem given in Figure 6 meets the conditions of Theorem 6.2 because 1. By Definition 3.1, the ⊕ operator is associative, commutative, and idempotent; hence (D, ⊕) is a semilattice. By Definition 3.1(5), (D, ⊕) has no infinite descending chains.
2. The distributivity of each of the production functions g 1 , . . . , g 6 over arbitrary, non-empty, finite index sets follows from repeated application of Definition 3.1(3).
3. Production functions g 3 , . . . , g 6 are strict in 0 in each argument because 0 is an annihilator with respect to ⊗ (Definition 3.1(4)). Production functions g 1 and g 2 are constants (i.e., functions with no arguments), and hence meet the required condition trivially.
Thus, one algorithm for solving the GPR problem for a given weighted PDS W, initial configuration p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n , and regular set C (represented by automaton A) is as follows:
• Create the combined weighted PDS WA.
• Define the corresponding abstract grammar problem according to the schema shown in Figure 6 .
• Solve this abstract grammar problem by finding the maximum fixed point using chaotic iteration: for each nonterminal X, the fixed-point-finding algorithm maintains a value l(X), which is the current estimate for X's value in the maximum fixed-point solution; initially, all l(X) values are set to 0; l(X) is updated whenever a value l(Y ) changes, for any Y used on the right-hand side of a production whose left-hand-side nonterminal is X.
A More Efficient Algorithm for the GPR Problem
The approach given in the previous section is not very efficient: for a configuration p, γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n , it takes Θ(|Q| n−1 |F |) time and space just to create the grammar productions in Figure 6 with left-hand-side nonterminal Accepting[γ 1 γ 2 . . . γ n ] (p,q) . However, we can improve on ,γ 1 ,q 1 ) , PS (q 1 ,γ 2 ,q 2 ) , . . . , PS (q n−1 ,γn,q) Moreover, all GPR questions with respect to a given target-configuration set C involve the same subgrammar for the PS nonterminals. As in the (ordinary) pushdownreachability problem [11, 20] , the information about whether a complete derivation tree with root nonterminal PS (q,γ,q ) exists (i.e., whether PS (q,γ,q ) is a productive nonterminal) can be precomputed and returned in the form of an (annotated) automaton of size O(|Q| |∆| + |→ 0 |). Exploring the PS subgrammar lazily saves us from having to construct the entire PS subgrammar. Productive nonterminals represent automaton transitions, and the productions that involve any given transition can be constructed on-thefly, as is done in Algorithm 1, shown in Figure 7 .
It is relatively straightforward to see that Algorithm 1 solves the grammar problem for the PS subgrammar from Figure 6 : workset contains the set of transitions (PS nonterminals) whose value l(t) has been updated since it was last considered; in line 8 all values are set to 0. A function call update(t, r, T ) computes the new value for transition t if t can be created using rule r and the transitions in the ordered list T . Lines 9 and 10 process the rules of types (1) and (2), respectively. Lines 11-17 represent the fixed-pointfinding loop: lines 13, 15, and 17 simulate the processing of rules of types (3) and (4) that involve transition t on their right-hand side; in particular, line 4 corresponds to invocations of production functions g 3 and g 4 . Note that line 4 can change l(t) only to a smaller value (w.r.t. ). The iterations continue until the values of all transitions stabilize, i.e., workset is empty.
From the fact that Algorithm 1 is simply a different way of expressing the grammar problem for the PS subgrammar, we know that the algorithm terminates and computes the desired result. Moreover, apart from operations having to do with l, the algorithm is remarkably similar to the pre * algorithm from [20] -the only major difference being that transitions are stored in a workset and processed multiple times, whereas in [20] each transition is processed exactly once. Thus, if is the length of the maximal-length descending chain in the semiring and c o is the maximal cost of an extender or combiner operation, the time complexity increases from the complexity of the unweighted case [20] by a factor of · c o , i.e. the GPR problem can be solved in time O(c o · |Q| 2 |∆| · ). (More efficient techniques that apply to certain semirings that are total orders are discussed in Section 6.5.)
Given the annotated pre * automaton, the value of δ(c) for any configuration c can be read off from the automaton by following all paths by which c is acceptedaccumulating a value for each path-and taking the meet of the resulting value set. The value-accumulation step can be performed using a straightforward extension of a standard algorithm for simulating an NFA (cf. [1, Algorithm 3.4] ).
Algorithm 1 is a dynamic-programming algorithm for determining δ(c); Appendix A describes how to extend Algorithm 1 to keep additional annotations on transitions so that the path set ω(c) can be obtained.
Total Orderings
In the examples given in Section 3, the semirings all have the following properties: (i) the ordering is a total ordering; (ii) 1 is the least element with respect to ; and (iii) for all a, b ∈ D, a ⊗ b lub(a, b) (where lub denotes "least upper bound", or maximum, in the total order). In such cases, there is a much more efficient algorithm for the GPR problem based on ideas from Knuth's generalization of Dijkstra's algorithm for the shortest-path problem [27] . 5 • In Algorithm 1, workset is implemented using a priority queue, and the transition selected in line 12 is always one with minimum value. Line 5 changes to
where adjustPriorityQueue(P Q, i, k) inserts item i into a priority queue P Q with key k if i ∈ P Q, and changes the key of item i to k if i ∈ P Q already. With this approach, the transitions processed form a nondecreasing sequence; hence, no transition is selected from workset more than once. (In the general case, the label of a transition may change even if the transition has been selected before, causing it to be added to workset again.) Compared to the PDS-reachability problem for the unweighted case, all it costs to compute the maximum fixed-point values is the cost of 5 The approach that we describe also applies to a slightly larger class of totally ordered abstract grammar problems studied by Ramalingam [34] ; however, our examples all fall into the class defined above, which was studied by Knuth [27] . maintaining a priority queue. Thus, the time complexity becomes O(c o · |Q| 2 |∆| · log(|Q| |∆| + |→ 0 |)).
• The set ω(c) contains exactly one path.
Discussion
We now discuss several issues that arise in applying the GAP framework.
Recency Policies. The recency metric presented in Section 3 is rather simplistic compared to some others that have been studied: recency policies can be based on a number of factors, such as the financial risk of the authentication/authorization decision [44] , semantics and invalidity rate of the certificate contents, and the security of the system used to generate the certificate. In a realistic setting, recency values of certificates need to be normalized. One possibility is to base the normalization on the remaining lifetime of the certificate (assuming the "not after" times in the validity specification were appropriately chosen). Let the lifetime of a certificate be L = T not after − T current (provided the certificate is still valid, i.e., T current is before T not after ), and let the recency of a certificate c i be defined by
. In this case, the semiring for recency is (Ê ≥0 ∪ {∞}, min, max, ∞, 0).
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Multiple Security Policies. Authorization policies may be subject to multiple security policies. For example, we might wish to satisfy simultaneously a most-recent certificate-chain policy and a privacy-preserving policy. One approach is the policy-priority approach, in which the user declares the order of security-policy priorities; for instance, privacy may be the first priority and recency the second priority. Such problems can be addressed in the GAP framework, when the component policies involve total orders, by using pairs of values as semiring values-e.g., (privacy, recency) values-and defining ⊕ to be lexicographic minimum [ Trust Policies. Several trust policies or metrics have been proposed in the literature, such as [7, 31, 35, 36, 50] . Not all trust metrics can be efficiently modeled in the GAP framework. For example, consider the proposed Bounded Disjoint Paths (BDP) and Bounded Connective Paths metric, which are are NP-hard and coNP-hard, respectively [35] . Thus, there is little hope of finding an efficient solution to these problems. We have not investigated whether the approximation algorithms [32, 35] developed for these problems are applicable in our setting. Similarly, the minimum-capacity-cut metric [36] cannot be easily formulated in our framework. Because BDP and weighted shortest paths are both interesting metrics in the certificate-chain context, one might consider trying to use a metric of weighted-disjoint-bounded paths for certificatechain evaluation. However, the weighted-disjoint-boundedpaths problem has been shown to be NP-complete for length bounds greater than 5, and approximation algorithms are NP-hard [10] .
Related Work
A certificate-chain-discovery algorithm for SPKI/SDSI was first proposed by Clarke et al. [16] . A credential-chaindiscovery algorithm for the role-based trust management language RT 0 was presented by Li et al. [30] . In the proofcarrying-authorization (PCA) framework of Appel and Fel-ten [3] , a client uses the theorem prover Twelf [33] to construct a proof of authorization, which the client presents to the server. To the best of our knowledge, no one has previously considered issues such as privacy and trust in the context of certificate-chain-discovery algorithms for trust management systems or authorization-proof-construction algorithms for PCA. Our algorithm is based on an algorithm for a generalized shortest-path problem in which weights on edges are drawn from a semiring. This approach is quite general, and it is likely that this approach applies to other formalisms besides SPKI/SDSI.
Pushdown systems are related to "unrestricted hierarchical state machines", which are collections of finite-state transition systems connected by call and return transitions [2, 6] . They are also related to the "interprocedural controlflow graphs" [43] and "exploded supergraphs" [37] used in interprocedural dataflow analysis. Thus, dataflow analysis is another possible application of weighted PDSs. The algorithm for solving GPR problems developed in Section 6.4 is related to certain existing dataflow-analysis algorithms [43, 26, 41] . In particular, Sagiv et al. showed how to compute meet-over-all(-valid)-paths values for multientry/multi-exit hierarchically structured graphs [41] . However, with respect to previous work on interprocedural dataflow analysis, Section 6 makes two contributions:
• Conventional dataflow-analysis algorithms merge together the values for all configurations with the same top-of-stack symbol. With weighted PDSs, dataflow queries can be posed with respect to a regular language of initial stack configurations. This provides a strict generalization of the kind of answers obtainable via ordinary interprocedural dataflow-analysis algorithms.
• Because the algorithm for solving GPR problems can provide a witness set of paths, one can provide a client of the analysis algorithm with an explanation of why the answer to a dataflow query has the value reported.
The application of weighted PDSs for interprocedural dataflow analysis is examined in greater detail in [38] . Model checking of pushdown systems has also been used for verifying security properties of programs [21, 23, 14] . Thus, another application of weighted pushdown systems is for verifying security properties of programs, where the verification process requires knowing interprocedural dataflow information. Bouajjani, Esparza, and Toulli [12] independently developed a similar framework, in which pre * and post * queries on pushdown systems with weights drawn from a semiring are used to solve (overapproximations of) reachability questions on concurrent communicating pushdown systems. Their method of obtaining weights on automaton transitions significantly differs from ours. Instead of deriving the weights directly, they are obtained using a fix-
